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Developing the bond market(s) of 
East Asia: global, regional or national? 
Robert N McCauley and Yung-Chul Park
1 
The various initiatives to develop Asian bond markets tend to draw on a shared analysis of 
the Asian crisis of 1997-98. It is generally agreed that the mismatch between foreign 
currency debt and domestic currency cash flows, on the one hand, and short-term debt and 
long-term investments, on the other, left Asian firms and banks vulnerable to changing 
evaluations of creditworthiness and to exchange rate depreciation. More controversial is a 
related argument, which gained force as East Asia, excluding Japan, moved into a 
substantial current account surplus after the crisis. Asia is thought to be missing an 
opportunity if its savings flow into global capital markets only to be reinvested in some 
measure in the region at higher yields and at the discretion of global investors.
2 The 
development of a regional bond market or domestic bond markets is promoted to make 
financial structures more resilient, to diversify sources of financing and to increase the asset 
menu for investment in Asia. 
Discussion of means to promote bond market development in East Asia can lose clarity 
owing to the very different images of the desired outcome held by the participants. In 
particular, some participants envision the creation of a regional market in which borrowers 
from around the region obtain funding in regional currencies from regional investors. Others 
envision improvement to the markets in which predominantly domestic borrowers meet 
predominantly domestic investors. For the sake of completeness and of drawing distinctions 
as boldly as possible, it is also worthwhile to consider a third image, namely that of 
globalised financial markets in which East Asian borrowers and investors participate as 
relatively small players. 
This paper first defines terms and proceeds to sketch out these three alternative paths: 
global, regional and national. It then considers where markets currently stand, recognising 
that reality cuts across the neat ideal types sketched. Next, policies proposed to develop 
bond markets are lined up with the different images. Finally, we conclude with our own views 
on the preferred image. 
                                                  
1  The authors are grateful to Clifford Dammers, Guorong Jiang, Malcolm Knight, Francis Lau, Bob Rankin and 
Philip Wooldridge for drawing various points to our attention and to Christian Dembierment, Denis Pêtre and 
Swapan-Kumar Pradhan for statistical assistance. Any errors remain those of the authors. Views expressed 
are those of the authors and not the Bank for International Settlements. 
2  This is not the place to analyse these widely shared presumptions in depth. Suffice it to say that Korea’s 
sizeable bond market before the crisis did not prevent a crisis. Moreover, it is not clear, at least at the 
aggregate level, that Korea suffered a currency mismatch problem. Bond market development can only keep 
East Asian savings in East Asia on a net basis if it increases domestic investment or consumption, leading to 
higher absorption and narrow current account surpluses. Gross flows are another matter. For development of 
the currency mismatch question, the prospects for narrower current accounts and two-way capital flows, 
respectively, see Cho and McCauley (2003), Park (2004) and McCauley (2003a). 20  BIS Papers No 30
 
1. Defining  terms 
Asian bonds are defined by residence of issuer. They are interest bearing obligations of 
Asian governments, financial institutions or corporations, wherever marketed and in whatever 
currency of denomination. 
Bond markets can be classified according to residence of issuer, targeted investors and 
currency of denomination. For instance, the BIS international securities data cover everything 
but issues by residents targeted at resident investors denominated in domestic currency 
(Table 1). Issues by non-residents targeted at resident investors and denominated in 
domestic currency are part of the foreign bond markets, which go by various colourful names 
(yankee for United States; samurai for Japan; bulldog for the United Kingdom). Offshore (or 
“euro” in the old sense) markets involve targeting investors with bonds not denominated in 
their domestic currency. 
Table 1 
Classification of BIS securities statistics 
  Issues by residents  Issues by non-residents 
In domestic currency     
  Targeted at resident 
investors 
Domestic  International (foreign: yankee, 
samurai, bulldog) 
  Targeted at non-resident 
investors 
International (offshore or 
euromarket) 
International (offshore or 
euromarket) 
In foreign currency  International International 
Source: BIS (2003a), p 14. 
 
Our approach to defining global, regional and national or domestic markets relies primarily on 
the “who’s who” of issuers and investors and to a lesser extent on currency of denomination. 
Thus, global markets require broad international participation on the sell and the buy side, 
but can, conceptually at least, operate in as few as one or as many as all of the world’s 
currencies. A regional bond market would be defined primarily as one that brings together 
issuers and investors from a region, and secondarily as one that uses the currencies of the 
region. Finally, domestic bond markets feature mostly domestic issuers and investors, 
although foreign investors may play a more or less important role, while the currency of 
choice is the local currency. 
We fine-tune our definitions of global, regional and national or domestic markets to East Asia and 
play down the distinction between onshore and offshore markets. Global bond markets would 
mostly feature dollar or euro bonds underwritten in London, placed in Asia and Europe and 
housed in Euroclear or Clearstream, as well as truly global bonds, which are also 
SEC-registered, offered simultaneously offshore and in the United States and housed in both the 
offshore depositories and the US Depository Trust Company.
3 Yen issues by Asian borrowers 
are taken to be examples of regional bonds whether they are legally sold offshore (relative to 
Japan) as euroyen bonds, onshore as samurai bonds or onshore as private placements. Issues 
by Asian borrowers non-resident in Hong Kong SAR or Singapore denominated in Hong Kong or 
Singapore dollars (foreign bonds rather than offshore bonds) are also termed regional bonds. It 
should be clear, therefore, that we consider that there are potentially several regional bond 
markets in East Asia. Further, one can imagine domestic regulations or withholding taxes 
                                                  
3  As well as the near-global bonds, underwritten offshore and placed in the United States under the SEC Rule 
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favouring Thai or Korean borrowers selling Thai baht or Korean won bonds in Tokyo or Hong 
Kong. Such an offshore market would also count as a regional bond market, owing to issuers 
and investors sharing East Asian residence and the use of a regional currency. 
2.  Global bond markets 
East Asian issuers and investors could integrate themselves into global bond markets. Global 
markets require cosmopolitan participation of issuers and investors, but could function with one 
or many currencies. At one extreme, global markets might operate with only one currency, or 
only with major currencies like dollar, euro and yen. At the other extreme, global markets might 
be very accepting of different currencies. 
Global bond market integration with few currencies 
The extreme of one or few currencies would maximise the liquidity of bonds issued by East 
Asian issuers and the liquidity of bonds bought by East Asian investors. With well developed 
derivatives markets, issuers could swap the proceeds of their bond issues back into domestic 
currencies; similarly, investors could contract asset swaps to transform bonds denominated in 
major currencies into domestic currency assets. 
The example of Canada is more to the point than that of any emerging market. When the 
issuers from an emerging market borrow in major currencies, the presumption is often made 
that they have no choice. That is, it is assumed that international investors, and perhaps 
domestic investors as well, will not buy bonds denominated in the home currency. Controversy 
attaches to whether this is a result, as it were, of natal curse (“original sin”) or is rather the 
reaction of investors to a history of variable inflation and less subtle violations of creditors’ 
rights. With Canada, by contrast, there is obviously a choice, although that choice has 
increasingly favoured the greenback rather than the loony. 
Canadian corporations’ bond issues show an evolution to this first version of globalised 
markets. In the mid-1970s, Canadian firms denominated 80% of their bonds in the home 
currency. This proportion declined over the next 10 years, but recovered as Canadian firms 
sold Canadian dollar bonds in the eurobond market (moving from the domestic bond market to 
the global bond market in the second sense). This offshore demand for Canadian dollar bonds 
was associated with the higher interest rates on Canadian dollar bonds than on US dollar 
bonds at the time. As Canadian interest rates converged to US interest rate levels in the 
1990s, the offshore demand dropped off and the Canadian dollar share started to fall again. By 
2001, Canadian firms used the US dollar as much as the Canadian dollar to denominate their 
bonds. 
It might be thought that the Canadian corporate sector’s use of the US dollar to denominate its 
bonds merely reflects the general level of the Canadian economy’s integration with the US 
economy, and thus the general use of the US dollar by Canadian households and firms. It is 
important to recognise, however, that the predominant role of the US dollar in the bond market 
stands out as an exception (Murray and Powell (2002)). Canadian holdings of dollars amount 
to no more than 10% of Canadian holdings of cash or money, and no more than 20% of bank 
loans or institutional portfolios. Canadian companies denominate their bonds, but not their 
bank loans, in US dollars because that way their bonds can find a wider market and thus fetch 
higher prices. To some extent, this wider market depends on differences on the buy and sell 
side in the readiness to use the derivatives markets. Thus, some managers of US dollar 
portfolios are not prepared to swap Canadian dollars into US dollars,
4 while the large Canadian 
                                                  
4  In the bank loan market, the major investors, namely banks, are in the swap business, while the smaller firms 
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firms that sell US dollar bonds could all be presumed to be prepared to swap out of the US 
dollar liabilities into Canadian dollar liabilities to achieve a desired currency mix of liabilities. In 
addition, the tilt towards the US dollar bond market by Canadian firms would enable their 
bonds to gain value from the greater depth, breadth and liquidity of US dollar markets, 
including the superior interest rate hedging and dealer financing capacities in the US dollar. 
Graph 1 
Currency denomination of bonds 



















Source: Bank of Canada. 
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The Canadian corporate sector’s integration into the global dollar bond market is matched in 
East Asia by firms in Hong Kong and Singapore. In part, this reflects the importance of 
multinational firms headquartered in the two city economies, such as Hutchison Whampoa, 
which in 2003 built up a single dollar bond to the size of $4 billion. Relying on a different 
source of data, Fernandez and Klassen (2004) find that Philippine firms denominate the bulk 
of their bonds in the dollar. 
Graph 3 
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Source: BIS Quarterly Review, Tables 12C and 16B, data for September 2003. 
One can see aspects of this global vision at work in the market for East Asian dollar bonds. 
Thus it is widely thought that one of the largest holders of the Republic of Korea’s 2013 dollar 
bond is an insurance company connected to one of the largest chaebol in Korea. It is thought 
to have bought the dollar paper and to have swapped the dollar cash flows for Korean won 
cash flows, thereby matching its liabilities to its policyholders. 
Proponents of the global image of bond market development for East Asia would readily 
acknowledge that cross-currency hedging markets need to develop further. Only then could it 
be assumed that firms can sell dollar bonds and hedge into domestic currency liabilities, and 
institutional investors can buy dollar bonds and hedge into domestic currency assets. In the 
face of capital controls, non-resident equity investors and multinational firms have 
contributed to the development of non-deliverable forward foreign exchange markets in the 
region (Ma et al (2004)). More to the point are the longer-term cross-currency swap markets, 
which allow the hedging of whole streams of cash flows stretching over years. These tend to 
have been small at the time of the last comprehensive measurement, in April 2001, although 
they have generally grown since (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Cross-currency swap markets: daily 
turnover in millions of US dollars 
 AU  CN  HK  IN  ID  JP  KR MY NZ PH  SG TW  TH  CA  EU 
2001 510  0  285  1  13  1,969 46 0  101 2  18  21 11 361  2,190
2003 na  0  30-50 250-300 0  na 100 0  na  “Volatile” “Volatile”  20-30  15-20 na  na 
Sources: Hohensee and Lee (2006) for 2003; BIS (2002), pp 78-81 for 2001. 24  BIS Papers No 30
 
Global bond market integration with many currencies 
There is another, more inclusive image of global bond markets. Instead of a duopoly or 
oligopoly of currencies, the international bond market can be conceived of as an open 
competition among currencies. Currencies from East Asia and the Pacific could be, and to 
some extent are, integrated into this global bond marketplace. The euro has surpassed the 
dollar in this market and, taken together, the two currencies represent about 85% of 
outstanding international bonds - close to a duopoly in practice (Graph 4). Sterling represents 
the next biggest currency sector, with 7% of outstanding bonds. Taken together, currencies 
of East Asia and the Pacific (broken out on the right-hand side) amount to $650 billion in 
international bonds, about 6% of the total of over $11 trillion. Of these, the Japanese yen 
represents the largest part (about three quarters of the regional total), with 4% of outstanding 
international bonds. The Australian dollar, Hong Kong dollar, Singapore dollar and New 
Zealand dollar bonds follow. There is a small New Taiwan dollar segment as well, while a 
few equity-linked capital issues for Thai banks were denominated in Thai baht and sold to 
international investors. All in all, five or six of the EMEAP economies have a presence in the 
international bond market. 
The international bond markets have shown a willingness to accept peripheral or “exotic” 
currencies, especially when these offer higher yields to compensate for lack of familiarity, 
greater perceived exchange rate risk and often lower liquidity. Thus, higher coupon 
payments have characterised the so-called dollar bloc currencies (the Canadian, Australian 
and New Zealand dollars) when these have sold well. The process of monetary unification in 
Europe led to “convergence plays” on the Finnish markka, Irish pound, Portuguese escudo, 
Spanish peseta, Italian lira and, most recently, the Greek drachma. This same thinking now 
warms investors to Polish zloty and Czech koruna bonds (Table 3). In contrast, investors 




Minor currency bonds outstanding in the 
international bond market, end-2003 
Billions of US dollars 
Argentine peso  0.9  Singapore dollar  9.4 
Czech koruna  8.0  South African rand  9.3 
Hong Kong dollar  45.6  New Taiwan dollar  4.0 
Polish zloty  5.2  Thai baht  1.7 
Source: BIS. 
 
Outside Europe, foreign investors have had their choice between buying South African rand 
bonds in the international bond market and buying the government bonds in the domestic 
market. Chile and Mexico have not allowed their bonds denominated in their respective 
pesos to be sold in international markets. 
A common element in the dollar bloc, peripheral European and other issues is a higher 
coupon than that available on bonds denominated in major currencies. One could argue, in 
fact, that, although all of the currency sectors listed in Table 3 satisfy the BIS definition of 
international bonds, the relatively low-coupon Hong Kong dollar, Singapore dollar and New 
Taiwan dollar bonds have not been widely marketed outside the three economies. If wider 
demand in the international bond market does indeed depend on attractive coupons, then the 
higher-coupon, moderate-inflation currencies of East Asia may have the best shot at 
international portfolios. In particular, the Korean won, Philippine peso and Indonesian rupiah BIS Papers No 30  25
 
in East Asia, and Indian rupee bonds in South Asia, could meet with the greatest demand. 
The acceptance of such bonds to investors in global offshore markets has not been tested to 
date owing to the unwillingness of domestic authorities to permit them. 
Graph 4 
Currency composition of the international bond market 
 
3. Regional  bond  market 
In a regional bond market, governments, banks and companies in the region would tap 
institutional investors, banks, mutual funds and individuals in the region. There is a strong 
feeling in East Asia that the region has never achieved what Europe had before the euro. As 
Donald Tsang, Hong Kong’s then Financial Secretary, asked rhetorically, “How is that we in 
Asia have never been able to replicate the eurobond market success in this part of the world?” 
(Tsang (1998)). We interpret the reference to have been to European issuers’ selling bonds 
denominated in European currencies largely to European buyers. This section first gives an 
example of an East Asian issuer tapping regional portfolios in a regional currency. Then the 
truth of Tsang’s observation is demonstrated in terms of currency sectors. This section then 
considers whether there are important regional elements in the international dollar bond market 
and, more narrowly, in the international market for Australian dollar bonds. 
KAL bond issue 
An example of an Asian firm tapping a regional bond market is provided by the Korean Air 
Lines issue in 2003. Given Korea’s proximity to Japan and the flow of tourists from Japan to 
Korea, Korean Air has a regular flow of yen receipts from travel agents in Japan. By pooling 
these cash flows, and adding a credit enhancement from the Korea Development Bank, a 
yen-denominated bond could be issued that met the quality demands of Japanese investors. 
Regional issuers in regional currencies: Europe versus Asia 
It is well known that the introduction of the euro has helped to encourage European issuance 
in the new currency, and led to rapid growth of the euro bond market. Part of this growth has 
been in the international bond segment, and has led the euro sector to overtake the dollar 
sector (Graph 4 above). The relevance of all these observations for East Asia is at best 
distant, since few foresee the introduction of a common currency in East Asia for a 
generation. 
Dollar Euro  Pound Other Yen Aust dollar 
HK dollar  Sing dollar NZ dollar NT dollar Baht26  BIS Papers No 30
 
Of greater relevance is the record of the international bond market before the introduction of 
the euro. Scrolling back 10 years, what role did the Deutsche mark, its surrogates (like the 
Dutch guilder, Danish krone or ECU), and its immediate competitors like the French franc 
and others, play in the meeting the international financing needs of European governments, 
banks and corporations? 
Looking at the left-hand panel of Graph 5, it is clear that the euro’s predecessor currencies 
played a predominant role in the international bond offerings of European (defined here as 
current EU) borrowers. To be sure, dollar issues figure importantly, but since at least five years 
before the euro, its predecessor currencies have accounted for more issuance than the dollar. 
The regional element is even larger when the share of sterling bonds is taken into account. 
The right-hand panel tells a very different story. Issuance by East Asian governments, banks 
and corporations in the international bond market is overwhelmingly dollar-denominated. 
Regulation, buy-side characteristics and exchange rate management have all played roles in 
preventing Asia’s currencies from posing tougher competition to the dollar. 
To begin with, the authorities in important Asian countries have not been prepared to accept 
non-resident issues targeted at resident investors or offshore issues in their currencies. In 
the case of Singapore, foreign issuers have been allowed to sell Singapore dollar bonds, but 
only to swap the proceeds into foreign currency. Thus, a multinational company with 
operations in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand that found the Singapore dollar an 
attractive currency to borrow in, both because of its movement with regional currencies and 
because of the low interest rate, might be able to access the Singapore dollar bond market, 
but not hold liabilities in the Singapore dollar at the end of the day. Regulation in the form of 
Japanese-language registration requirements has also made especially opportunistic 
issuance in the yen difficult. 
Graph 5 
Announced international bonds and 
notes issuance by nationality and currency 
In billions of US dollars 
(semi-logarithmic scales) 
 
1    European Union refers to the current membership. Euro is the euro or its predecessor 
currencies.   
2    Comprises Australia, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand. 
Sources: Dealogic; Euroclear; ISMA; Thomson Financial Securities Data; BIS. 
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Nishi and Vergus (2004) emphasise the risk appetite of Japanese investors, and this factor, 
unlike regulation which has only eased over time, can explain why East Asian issuance in 
yen has not regained the levels reached before the Asian crisis (while that in the dollar has). 
Japanese investors are increasingly prepared to run currency risk, otherwise there would not 
be such an active market for Australian dollar paper there. When it comes to credit risk, 
however, Japanese investors’ own recent domestic financial history has not well prepared 
them to accept it. Moreover, they feel burned by their experience with domestic high-yield 
issuers like Mycal and more so with foreign high-yield, high-risk issuers like Argentina. Thus, 
while a below investment grade issuer like the Republic of the Philippines, or even 
investment grade Federation of Malaysia, have tapped the dollar and euro segments of the 
international bond market, they have not sold much in the way of yen bonds. The yen bond 
market is also limited by the risk appetites of Japanese institutional investors. With rare 
exceptions like the leasing group Orix, Japanese institutional investors, like Japanese 
households, have been more willing to take on currency risk than credit risk in external 
investments. To be fair, as argued by Remolona and Schrijvers (2003), starting with a 
low-risk portfolio, yield enhancement through acceptance of credit risk is inherently a trickier 
proposition than yield enhancement through acceptance of foreign exchange risk. Because 
of the fat left tail of the distribution of returns on risky bonds, diversification requires very 
broad portfolios (which are particularly hard for a bond-picking household to assemble). 
Exchange rate management may also play a role in the limited development of an Asian 
regional bond market. Regional currencies have tracked the yen only to a limited extent, at 
least until recently. This means that from the perspective of issuers worried about the 
possibility of their liabilities blowing up, selling yen bonds may have posed greater exchange 
rate risk than selling dollar bonds. The contrast with Europe would be that after the onset of 
generalised floating in 1973, a number of European currencies shared much of the Deutsche 
mark’s movements against the dollar, thereby reducing the risk of governments’ and 
corporations’ mark borrowing. Nevertheless, Schmidt (2004) has argued that the yen 
markets have missed an opportunity in recent years insofar as regional currencies, especially 
the Korean won, have shared much of the yen’s movements against the dollar. 
Exchange rate management also bears on the attractiveness of the Hong Kong dollar as a 
currency to denominate bonds. Typically, there is a premium of long-term Hong Kong dollar 
yields over US dollar yields, in part reflecting currency risk and in part reflecting liquidity. To 
pay more for a Hong Kong dollar bond than a US dollar bond thus requires a view on the 
Hong Kong dollar. Thus, most international issuance of Hong Kong dollar bonds has been 
either opportunistic (that is, driven by profitable opportunities to swap the proceeds) or for 
funding assets in Hong Kong. 
Regional elements in international bond markets 
There may be important regional elements in the global bond markets as they concern East 
Asia and the Pacific.
5 One regional element in the international bond market is the placement 
of international Australian dollar bonds in Japan among retail investors. Another, broader 
regional element may be a regional bias in the investor base for US dollar bonds sold by 
East Asian borrowers. 
                                                  
5  Above, it was argued that the Canadian corporate sector had integrated its bonds into global capital markets, 
progressively eschewing the Canadian dollar in favour of issuing bonds into the broader, deeper and more 
liquid US dollar market. This was taken to be a case of embracing the global bond market. From another 
perspective, this is a case of regionalism in bond markets, since many US buy-side investors’ portfolio 
guidelines or restrictions would treat Canadian issuers the same as US issuers. What is on one view a strong 
case of globalisation, might therefore on another view seem to be a case of regionalism within global markets. 28  BIS Papers No 30
 
Uridashi market 
As explained in the paper in this conference by Nishi and Vergus (2004), Japanese securites 
houses market Australian dollar bonds formally issued as international bonds to Japanese 
households. Since the household buyers are averse to credit risk, if not currency risk, the 
issuers of the bonds are mostly very high-quality governments or agencies from outside 
Australia. They are opportunistic issuers looking only for cheap funding when measured 
against US dollar Libor or Euribor. Through the swap market, their liabilities ultimately are 
taken on by Australian banks or firms financing assets in Australia. While complicated, the 
essence of the transactions is the willingness of Japanese households to take on the 
currency risk of the Australian dollar in exchange for a decent coupon. And what is clear is 
that these bonds require an ongoing investment in providing information to Japanese 
households by the Japanese securities firms. 
Is it possible to imagine this same marketing being applied to the sale of, say, Korean won 
bonds to Japanese households? While Korea does not possess Australia’s aura of a 
vacation and honeymoon destination, it has had another advantage in recent years. As noted 
above, the won has shared a considerable, albeit varying, part of the yen’s movements 
against the dollar. A Japanese investor in a won bond would have experienced less volatility 
in the value of their holdings compared to an investment in a US dollar bond. Were such a 
co-movement to persist it would favour the development of Japanese demand for won 
bonds. Indeed, the relative stability of the won in terms of yen led Korean companies, 
reportedly small and medium-sized enterprises with little in the way of yen cash flows, to 
build up $7 billion in yen debt from Korean banks in 2002.
6 
A regional bias in investment in US dollar bonds issued by Asian borrowers? 
A question has arisen whether Asian buyers figure disproportionately among investors in US 
dollar bonds issued by East Asian governments and corporations. Market participants have 
coined the term “Asian bid” to describe this asserted clientele, which is used to explain the 
spreads of such bonds or their stability (Fernandez and Li (2002), Woods (2002), Schmidt 
(2004)). McCauley et al (2002) consulted the trade press for reports of the placement of 
dollar- and euro-denominated bonds of East Asian issuers and reported that almost half were 
placed in Asia. Eichengreen and Park (2003) question whether there is anything more to the 
Asian bid than home country investors’ buying dollar bonds. 
There is agreement that there is home bias. For instance, Korean banks and institutional 
investors are reported to be important holders of the Republic’s and Korean Development 
Bank’s dollar bonds; Philippine banks match their US dollar deposits with the shorter-dated 
Philippine government dollar bonds; and Chinese banks are reported to be important holders 
of Chinese dollar bonds. 
The question is whether, in addition to home bias, there is substantial regional bias. 
Eichengreen and Park show that during the period covered by McCauley et al, Japanese 
holdings of Asian bonds (presumably mostly dollar-denominated) actually fell in dollar 
amounts. They ask, if not Japanese investors, then who are the Asian investors with a 
regional taste in bond buying? Moreover, they argue that Asian investors do not plausibly 
have any informational advantage in buying Asian bonds and that, given the similarity of 
economic structure and business cycles, Asian investors cannot sensibly diversify by buying 
Asian dollar bonds. 
The issue will not be resolved here. The Box reviews the evidence from the BIS banking data 
and from the IMF’s portfolio capital survey in 2002. Substantial holdings of Asian bonds in 
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Hong Kong or Singapore leave open the question of the ultimate beneficial owner (eg an 
Indonesian bank branch there holding an Indonesian bond or a French-owned insurer there 
holding a Korean bond). There remains room for diverging interpretations of the data on 
cross-border holdings of Asian bonds in Asia. 
Regional bond market: a summary 
To conclude, although Asia enjoys more than one financial centre featuring the issuance of 
bonds by non-resident borrowers, the yen, the Hong Kong dollar and the Singapore dollar 
have not to date attracted a large share of the offshore issuance from the region. Unlike the 
EU countries in the years before the introduction of the euro, the international dollar market 
still captures most of the offshore issuance of bonds by regional borrowers. 
A variety of factors seem to be responsible for the relatively small role of existing regional 
bond markets in the international fund-raising of regional borrowers. Regulation used to limit 
access to the yen market by lower-rated borrowers and still imposes some costs. At this 
point, however, it is probably the aversion of Japanese investors to credit risk which poses 
the larger hurdle to regional issuance. Regulation does limit the ability of all foreign issuers to 
arrange Singapore dollar liabilities, while the currency board system in Hong Kong makes 
Hong Kong dollar funding generally unattractive to international borrowers. 
While there may be important regional currents in the flow of funds in the US and Australian 
dollar global bond markets, our overall result is that the regional bond markets to date have 
only offered limited funding options. Thus, we turn to the national markets, without having 
found a very solid alternative to them in the existing regional markets. 
 
Box 
Cross-border holdings of Asian bonds: banks and all investors 
Robert N McCauley and Patrick McGuire 
While there is broad agreement among policymakers in East Asia that further financial integration in 
the region would be desirable, no such consensus has emerged regarding the proper understanding 
of the current extent of such integration. Market-based analysts highlight the importance of the 
“Asian bid” - that is, a disproportionate representation of regional buyers - in the primary and 
secondary market for dollar bonds issued by East Asian governments, banks and firms.
1 This view 
has been challenged, however, by reference to official Japanese data on holdings of bonds by 
Japanese residents, which suggest low and declining holdings of the obligations of Asian issuers. 
This box consults two sources of evidence to shed light on the extent of the regional bias in holdings 
of international bonds issued by East Asian borrowers. First, the BIS international banking data 
report banks’ cross-border claims that take the form of bonds, providing country detail and a time 
series perspective. Banks are natural buyers of bonds, especially those of relatively short maturity 
or those bearing floating interest rates, but represent just one investor segment. Second, the IMF 
portfolio survey of securities holdings provides broader coverage of the investor base, capturing 
institutional investors as well as banks, but represents only a snapshot at end-2002. The IMF data 
are in principle universal, while the BIS reporting area does not include all the important Asian 
economies. 
BIS international banking data 
Even as a means to profile a single segment of investor demand, the BIS data are limited by the 
reporting area, which does not include some important economies in East Asia (BIS (2003b)). In 
 
____________________________  
1  See Schmidt, 2004. 
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Box (cont) 
Cross-border holdings of Asian bonds: banks and all investors 
particular, while Hong Kong SAR, Japan and Singapore are long-time reporters, Australia and 
Taiwan (China) have joined only recently. Yet to participate are China, Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand. Thus, Asian holdings of Asian bonds as measured by the BIS data will be smaller than the 
actual amount insofar as banks in these latter countries hold bonds issued by their neighbours. The 
data include both international bonds and domestic securities held offshore, for instance a Hong 
Kong bank’s holdings of a Korean treasury bond (which are, judging by Korean flow of funds data, 
very small).
2 
The BIS banking data do suggest a regional bias in holdings of Asian bonds by Asian banks. This 
conclusion emerges from two findings. First, as of the fourth quarter of 2003 BIS area banks held an 
estimated $66 billion in bonds issued by borrowers from Asia excluding Japan.
3 In terms of country 
composition, the largest holdings are vis-à-vis Singapore and Korea (as suggested by the BIS data 
on international bonds issued by Asia excluding Japan). Second, an estimated two thirds of these 
bonds are held in Asia, including Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Taiwan (see the graph below). 
About half the rest are held by banks in the United Kingdom.
4 Holdings of Asian bonds by reporting 
banks in Asia were squeezed by the combination of regional banks’ loss of access to international 
interbank markets during the period of the Japan premium and the Asian crisis, but have risen since 
late 1999. 
Estimated holdings of Asian bonds by BIS area banks 












IMF portfolio survey 
The IMF survey of cross-border portfolio holdings of bonds provides a matrix of holdings for East 
Asia and allows these holdings to be put into a global context (Bae et al (2006)). It shows holdings 
of long-term debt securities at the end of 2002 and includes both foreign currency and local 
currency bonds. These data need to be interpreted with some care because the decomposition by 
country is often not complete. 
____________________________  
2 The data also include some holdings of short-term paper, such as certificates of deposit, that are not relevant 
to the question under discussion. 
3 Asia excluding Japan includes Hong Kong, Singapore and Macao, typically classified as offshore centres by 
the BIS. 
4 The country composition of Hong Kong banks’ bond holdings is estimated using the composition of loans, 
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Box (cont) 
Cross-border holdings of Asian bonds: banks and all investors 
The data indicate an uneven but in aggregate high degree of regional bias in bond holdings across 
Asia excluding Japan. Asia excluding Japan holds over half (51.3%) the bonds issued by borrowers 
in that area (last row of the table). In the first column of the table, for instance, investors in Hong 
Kong put 12.8% of their international bond portfolio into Asian bonds, and, given the size of their 
aggregate portfolio, they account for a high share (7%) of international holdings of such bonds. 
Excluding Japanese bonds, Hong Kong holds 16% of global holdings of Asian bonds. Singapore puts 
a higher fraction of its overall international bond portfolio in Asian bonds, but, given its portfolio size, 
accounts for a smaller share (13.9%) of global holdings of Asia excluding Japan’s bonds. These 
portfolio data support the hypothesis of a regional bias. 
It turns out that the largest foreign investor in the region, Japan, does not show an Asian bias. While 
Japan’s holdings of Asian bonds amount to more than Hong Kong’s or Singapore’s holdings (last row 
of the table), they are very small from the Japanese perspective. Of the grand total of $7.7 trillion in 
cross-border bond investment captured by the survey, Asian bonds amount to about $225 billion 
(about 3%), of which Japanese bonds account for around two thirds ($160 billion). Global holdings of 
bonds from Asia excluding Japan thus amount to approximately 1% of holdings. Japan’s holdings of 
bonds from Asia excluding Japan are also around 1%, which is about par. Despite the scale of the 
Japanese portfolio and the country’s proximity, therefore, Japan has no disproportionate holdings of 
Asian bonds. In contrast, with double digit percentage weights on Asian bonds, investors in Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Macao (where the currency board vis-à-vis the Hong Kong dollar must play 
a role), Malaysia and Singapore do favour regional bonds. Given the scale of holdings, the regional 
bias derives mostly from the behaviour of portfolio managers in Hong Kong and Singapore. The 
result of a neutral Japanese weight, on the one hand, and regional bias elsewhere in the region, on 
the other, is the high fractions of internationally held bonds of Asia excluding Japan to be found in 
Asia (Table A, last column). 
Table A 
Cross-border investment in bonds, end-2002 
In millions of US dollars 
Investment from: 
Invested in: 









China 1,232  ...  578 38 15 ... 2 416 –  2,281  3,430 67 
Hong Kong SAR  ...  57  1,137 455 521 40 58 1,653 20  3,941  7,208 55 
India ...  ...  159 47 8 1 ... 241 –  456  788 58 
Indonesia ...  ...  49 78 ... 1 4 869 –  1,001  2,462 41 
Japan 5,351  ...  – 29 21 ... 5 3,828 –  9,234  159,937 6 
Korea   4,202  ...  5,348 ... 23 51 15 2,586 – 12,225 25,015 49 
Macao SAR  ...  ...  – ... ... ... ... ... –  0  1 0 
Malaysia 2,085  3  1,823 332 3 ... 9 1,830 – 6,085  8,844 69 
Philippines ...  5  1,389 81 ... 4 ... 595 – 2,074  7,805 27 
Singapore 1,842  23  680 144 31 41 23 ... –  2,784  6,451 43 
Taiwan, China  674  ...  46 ... 13 ... 7 333 –  1,073  1,372 78 
Thailand 447  ...  550 24 ... 1 ... 542 –  1,564  1,895 83 
Total in Asia  15,833 88  11,759 1,228 635 139 123 12,893 20 42,718  225,208 19 
Total investment  123,528 703  1,135,519 9,608 2,637 471 1,553 52,830 1,344  1,328,193  7,733,214 17 
Asia share
1 12.8  12.5  1.0 12.8 24.1 29.5 7.9 24.4 1.5 3.2  2.9 . 
Share of inv in 
Asia
1 7.0  0.0  5.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 5.7 0.0  19.0  . . 
Share of inv in 
Asia excl JP
1  16.1 0.1  18.0 1.8 0.9 0.2 0.2 13.9 0.0 51.3  . . 
1  In per cent. 




Cross-border holdings of Asian bonds: banks and all investors 
It can still be asked: who are the beneficial owners of the bonds held in the financial centres of Hong 
Kong and Singapore? To the extent that they are held at branches of banks headquartered outside 
the region, one could question whether there really is a regional bias. Whether institutional investors 
like insurance companies and pension funds would hold bonds in these centres to fund liabilities to 
retirees and policyholders outside the region is another issue. 
Based on the data reviewed, it can be said that a disproportionate share of cross-border holdings of 
bonds issued by East Asian borrowers is held in bank and institutional portfolios located in East 
Asia. Whether the ultimate beneficial ownership of these securities, in some sense, is likewise 
concentrated in Asia remains an open question. 
 
4.  National bond markets 
A third image for bond market development is the improvement of the working of the existing 
national bond markets. This image calls for many markets, not one global or regional market, 
to be developed. 
In the wake of the Asian crisis, and given deliberate attempts in places to increase issuance, 
these markets have reached substantial size, aggregating $1.2 trillion across East Asia 
excluding Japan (Jiang and McCauley (2004)). Even if one accepts HSBC’s definition of an 
investable universe of bonds, one still is confronted with an aggregate size of $270 billion, 
and this does not (yet) include China and Indonesia. This is considerably larger than the 
stock of dollar-denominated Asian bonds and even a larger multiple of outstanding 
yen-denominated Asian bonds. While these markets could no doubt be larger (Eichengreen 
and Luengnaruemitchai (2004)), the size of the local bond markets alone should give one 
pause when considering proposals that would ignore the development of national markets in 
favour of regional markets. 
This hesitation only increases when one considers that these national markets suffer to 
varying degrees from a lack of liquidity and a lack of investor diversity. One finding that holds 
across G10  government bond markets is that size matters for liquidity (McCauley and 
Remolona (2000)). That is, the larger the outstanding bonds, the higher the transactions 
volume and the narrower the bid-ask spread. This result holds across the local economies as 
well, although it appears to be weaker partly because of the developmental efforts of Hong 
Kong and Singapore (Graph 6). To be sure, other factors, such as the concentration of 
issuance in particular issues and the breadth of financing markets, make a difference. The 
implication of the importance of size for liquidity, however, is that global or regional issuance, 
particularly by the benchmark issuer, the government, comes at an opportunity cost. Every 
billion dollars of bonds sold abroad are bonds that will not contribute to the liquidity of the 
domestic market.  
The lack of investor diversity is also related to liquidity. Lack of a diverse investor base tends 
to make a bond market one-sided, with all the players at times attempting to adjust their 
portfolios in the same direction. In particular, a predominance of buy-and-hold investors can 
leave the secondary markets quite inactive. Even if the market has more active accounts, 
they may, like the Korean investment trust companies or the Thai bond mutual funds, be hit 
simultaneously with liquidity pressure, leading liquidity to dry up and prices to gap. It appears 
that a lack of diversity, as measured by the Herfindahl index of the concentration of bond 
holding, is related to the bid-ask measure of liquidity (Graph 6). BIS Papers No 30  33
 
Graph 6 
Liquidity in East Asian bond markets 
Size, trading, issue size and concentration 
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Sources: Barclays Capital; Bloomberg; Deutsche Bank; HSBC; BIS calculations. 
One way of diversifying the investor bases in national bond markets is to open them up to 
foreign investors, but efforts to develop a regional market could actually hold back such an 
opening. In Korea, for instance, while about 40% of the equity market is foreign-owned, only 
0.4% of the government bond market is foreign-held. Why this is so is not clear: Takeuchi 
(2004) considers the impediments to foreign investment in national bond markets and 
McCauley (2004) considers the costs and benefits of doing so. It is sometimes proposed that 
an easy way to get around these impediments might be to issue bonds offshore in a regional 
bond market. But this would not really bring foreign investors into the domestic bond market. 
The next time that investment trust companies or bond mutual funds suffered heavy 
withdrawals, there would still be no bid from foreign investors who could see a buying 
opportunity in the temporary liquidity pressure on selected institutions. 34  BIS Papers No 30
 
5.  Images of bond market development and policies 
This section considers the mapping between images of bond market development and 
policies that have been proposed to accelerate bond market development in Asia. Different 
intentions imply different policies. 
Policies for the global bond market 
Recall that we sketched out two versions of global bond market development, one with a 
narrow range of currencies and another with a wide range. Somewhat different policy 
considerations apply for each. 
The first version of global bond market development, which emphasises the network 
externalities of a currency oligopoly of dollar and euro, would at first blush seem 
unacceptable to many observers in the region, because it would apparently not respond to a 
central lesson of the Asian crisis. That is, while reliance on dollar or euro bond funding would 
perhaps minimise liquidity risks, it would involve firms in the region mismatching projects 
generating local currency cash flows with debt requiring foreign currency payments. In short, 
integration into the dollar and euro bond markets might address the maturity mismatch 
problem but would seem to leave the currency mismatch problem dangerously unaddressed. 
Proponents of this version of the global bond market development path might respond, 
however, that derivatives markets could transform dollar assets and liabilities into local 
currency exposures. After all, the Canadian example is not really a case of mismatch of 
currency obligations and receipts. Well developed currency swap markets allow Canadian 
firms to transform their US dollar obligations back into Canadian dollars. Against this, it might 
be argued that such hedging markets are developed to varying extents in the region (BIS 
(2002), Hohensee and Lee (2004)). Those who embrace this image of global bond market 
development, therefore, would need to consider the means for governments to encourage, or 
at least allow, the development of cross-currency swaps. 
Some would argue that even this global approach needs healthy national bond markets. 
Recently, the Australian Treasury considered whether to repay all of the Commonwealth’s 
bonds denominated in Australian dollars. As noted above, Australian firms and banks enjoy 
access to Australian dollar fixed and floating rate finance through the global (and regional) 
bond market, both directly and through currency swaps. Should the central price discovery 
mechanism in the Australian dollar bond market, the nexus of cash government bonds, 
repurchase markets and 10-year futures be allowed to wither? The overwhelming answer 
during the government’s consultation was no. To market participants, it was not clear that the 
currency and interest rate swap markets could function successfully, in both normal and 
stressed markets, as the central price discovery mechanism, that is, in the absence of a base 
of pricing of government bonds. In the end, Australia (2003) decided to retain its domestic 
government bond market, even if there were no funding need.
7 
Regarding the many-currency version of global bond market development, its implied policy 
agenda would be regulatory change that would permit the issuance of bonds denominated in 
Asian currencies in London, New York or Tokyo. As discussed in Eschweiler (2004), this 
would be quite a programme. Like the first image of global bond market development, this 
second version, it might be argued, requires national bond market development as a base for 
the pricing of bonds denominated in local currency, even if they are to be sold abroad. 
                                                  
7  See McCauley (2002) for a discussion (now moot) of whether global fixed income markets could function 
without US Treasury debt. BIS Papers No 30  35
 
Policies for a regional bond market  
Policies to promote regional bond market development include those on the sell side, those 
on the buy side and infrastructure. Consider each in turn. 
Just as integration of new, Asian currency sectors into the global bond market would require 
the authorities to permit offshore use of their currencies, so, too, any widening of regional 
bond markets from the status quo of the yen would require regulatory change. The European 
experience suggests that the regional development occurred on a wider base than the 
Deutsche mark alone, over which the German authorities continued to exercise control. 
Hybrid currencies like the ECU served as ways around that control. 
On the buy side as well, a genuinely regional market would require investment from a 
number of countries. Many large portfolios in the region, national pension or provident funds, 
for instance, have barely started their external diversification. When they are permitted to 
diversify externally, the global dollar and euro markets are among the natural first steps. In 
Thailand recently, the Bank of Thailand has authorised external investment of selected 
portfolios. In these authorisations, it is reported, some amounts are earmarked for investment 
in regional bonds. Thus, there are opportunities in the process of opening up fixed income 
portfolios to external investment for channelling funds into regional markets. Analytically, the 
question is whether such regional allocations come at the expense of global investment, or 
are in addition to them, as policymakers accelerate the opening in the pursuit of regional 
bond market development. 
Many observers take three policy initiatives for infrastructure to advance regional bond 
market development as a package. In particular, they see a regional credit guarantee 
agency, a regional bond rating facility and a regional clearing and settlement capacity all as 
pieces of infrastructure needed for regional bond market development (Oh and Park (2006), 
Park and Rhee (2006)). 
From our perspective, the regional credit guarantee agency is less specific to a particular 
image of bond market development. A regional credit guarantee agency could support the 
credit of borrowers from the region in accessing global, regional or domestic markets. For 
example, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand obtained World Bank guarantees 
for the principal and the next interest payment of a 10-year bond (Schmidt (2004, pp 49-50)). 
The bond was denominated in dollars and sold in the global market. To take another 
example, the Korean Air Lines deal described above used a Korean Development Bank 
credit enhancement to access the regional market in Tokyo. To take still another example, 
the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority), promotes mortgage securitisation in the territory with guarantees. 
Substitute a regional credit rating agency for the World Bank, the official Korean guarantor or 
the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation, and it is apparent that a regional credit guarantee 
agency could serve any of the three images of bond market development. 
Proposals for a regional rating agency or a regional clearing capacity, by contrast, strike us 
as specific to the image of regional bond market development. Global rating agencies 
already exist, and are increasingly targeting domestic bond markets with ratings specific to 
them (Packer (2003), Kisselev and Packer (2006)). National rating agencies also already 
exist. Similarly, a regional clearing capacity would sit between the global clearing capacity of 
Euroclear and Clearstream, on the one hand, and national clearing operations, on the other 
(Braeckevelt (2006)). 
Policies for domestic bond markets 
Policies for domestic bond market development in general, or for domestic government bond 
market development in particular, have been reviewed in a number of forums (APEC (1999), 
CGFS (1999)). 36  BIS Papers No 30
 
One aspect of developing domestic bond markets is opening them up to foreign investment. 
As argued above, foreign investment makes for a more diverse base of investors, even if the 
inward capital flow is not needed given current balance of payments surpluses in the region. 
The reason for the low levels of inward investment in local bond markets is not clear, and 
Takeuchi (2006) surveys market writings to identify the most important impediments to 
foreign investment. 
6. Conclusions 
We recommend that emphasis be placed on the third image of bond market development for 
Asia. That is, national bond markets should be developed with a view to integrating them with 
global markets at some stage. Even if one embraces the image of a global bond market, 
development of the national markets would probably be necessary under current 
circumstances. 
The impulse to regional development can contribute to national bond market development by 
bringing politically acceptable peer pressure to bear. The process of discussing the 
circumstances under which there could be more regional investment in domestic bond 
markets may raise the political salience of policy changes that will make domestic bond 
markets more friendly to foreign investors. The announcement by Thailand of an intended 
waiver of withholding tax on coupon interest paid to foreigners, which took place at the time 
of an international conference on Asian bond market development in Bangkok in October 
2003, may be a case in point. 
One might ask why peer pressure could accomplish what market pressure has failed to do. 
One answer is that market pressure has not been very strong because underlying balance of 
payments positions mean that most countries do not need the foreign capital. When 
countries in the region were running deficits, eg in the pre-crisis period in Thailand, there 
were a large current account deficit and a real funding need, but no government bonds. Now 
there are government bonds, but no particular need for additional capital inflows. It might be 
noted in this connection that the United States repealed its withholding tax on non-resident 
holdings of bonds only once a large current account deficit opened up in the mid-1980s. 
Moreover, market pressure is subject to the interpretation that market participants are 
arguing their narrow interests - to gain access to new revenue sources in domestic bond 
markets - rather than the national interest. This interpretation of self-interested advice in part 
reflects the memory of 1997-98. In contrast, peer pressure is less subject to the interpretation 
that advice to make markets more investor-friendly is self-interested. Finally, peer pressure 
may be more effective when it is collective. 
Care must be taken that measures taken to develop regional bond markets do not slow the 
development of domestic bond markets: the Korean Air Line deal provides an example of a 
very sensible regional issue using both securitisation of cash flows and guarantees to meet 
the high demand for credit quality of the Japanese investor base. A less sensible example 
would be further duplication of ABF1 - of course, not in the works - which could encourage 
dollar issuance by borrowers in the region at the expense of domestic market growth. 
Another untoward example would be the sale of government bonds offshore as part of an 
effort to develop regional markets. In particular, Kingdom of Thailand baht bonds might be 
underwritten and sold in Tokyo. As argued above, however, liquidity divided is liquidity lost. 
Every baht bond not traded in Bangkok would be one less bond that could be repurchased 
there or that could form part of a benchmark bond there, making the domestic market that 
much smaller and less liquid. In addition, in political economy terms, the easy option of 
offshore issuance may militate against removing domestic impediments. 
Similarly, care must be taken that infrastructure development for the region proves both 
consistent with eventual global integration and financially self-sustainable. We have argued BIS Papers No 30  37
 
above that a regional credit guarantee agency could serve the goal of domestic bond market 
development as well as regional bond market development. The ambition to bring small and 
medium-sized enterprise liabilities to the bond market must be informed by an analysis of 
losses on such programmes in recent years in Japan, Korea and Hong Kong (Jiang (2004)). 
Otherwise such an effort cannot be sustained. Similarly, it is easier to extend guarantees to 
highly leveraged firms not enjoying investment grade ratings than it is to ensure the revolving 
nature of the guarantees and capital supporting them. The view that Asia is stuck with a 
mismatch between the credit ratings that investors desire and the credit ratings that its 
companies are assigned is underpinned by a very partial view of corporate finances. The 
example of PCCW in Hong Kong, which started as a leveraged buyout of the local telephone 
company but is now managing its finances to achieve an A rating, reminds us that, within 
limits, corporate credit ratings are choice variables of corporate management. 
Regional initiatives for a rating agency and clearing system are structurally more risky in their 
dependence on an image of regional bond market development. A regional rating agency will 
ultimately have to pass the test of being at least a point of reference for investors from 
outside the region. In other words, its establishment needs to anticipate the integration of 
bond markets in the region into global markets. By its nature, a regional clearing system 
must ultimately be hooked up with national systems on one side and global ones like 
Euroclear and Clearstream on the other. 
Since this conference is being held in Korea to mark the hundredth anniversary of Korea 
University, perhaps we could end with a success criterion for national bond market 
development for Korea: instead of two orders of magnitude difference between foreign 
ownership of bonds and stocks in Korea, just one order of magnitude. That is, the Korean 
bond market might better have 4% foreign ownership than its present level of 0.4%. 
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